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Abstract—Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is spreading across the market rapidly due to its 
characteristics such as low cost, flexibility implementation, and versatility of new applications etc. 
However, the voice packets transmitted over the Internet are not protected in most VoIP environments, 
and then the user’s information could be easily compromised by various malicious attacks. So an 
energy-efficient authenticated key agreement protocol for Session Initial Protocol (SIP) should be 
provided to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data communications over VoIP networks.  To 
simplify the authentication process, several protocols adopt a verification table to achieve mutual 
authentication, but the protocols require the SIP server to maintain a large verification table which not 
only increases energy consumption but also leads to some security issues. Although several attempts have 
been made to address the intractable problems, designing an energy-efficient authenticated key 
agreement protocol for SIP-based green VoIP networks is still a challenging task. In this study, we 
propose an efficient authentication protocol for SIP by using smartcards based on elliptic curve 
cryptography. With the proposed protocol, the SIP server needs not to store a password or verification 
table in its database, and so no energy is required for the maintenance of the verification table. Security 
analysis demonstrates that the proposed protocol can resist various attacks and provides efficient 
password updating.  Furthermore, the experimental results show that the proposed protocol increases 
efficiency in comparison with other related protocols. 
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1. Introduction 
Internet and communication technologies boost and diversify the development of Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) applications. Compared with traditional Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTNs), 
VoIP networks attract great attention since they can provide low cost, flexibility implementation and 
versatility of new applications. So far, more than five million peoples adopt VoIP services, which are 
provided by Skype, Gtalk, and iPhone etc. However, with the rapid increase of the registered users on 
VoIP networks, the energy cost of VoIP networks is also growth with an alarming trend. Furthermore, 
since the voice data transmitted over the VoIP environments are not protected, the privacy and value 
information of the users could be compromised easily by inactive or active attacks (Wang and Liu, 2011).  
Session initiation protocol, developed by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), is a text-based 
application layer control protocol for VoIP setup, modification, and termination among participants. 
(Rosenberg et al., 2002). The architecture of the SIP is generally composed of the proxy server, redirect 
server, user agent, location server, and register server, as well as main network elements. Compared with 
other signaling protocols such as H.323, SIP is more lightweight and flexible. However, the 
authentication of SIP is inherited directly from HTTP Digest authentication (Franks et al., 1999), which is 
vulnerable to several attacks such as impersonation attacks, off-line password guessing attacks, and 
server-spoofing attacks etc. In an attempt to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of VoIP 
communication, an energy-efficient authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP should be sought to 
achieve mutual authentication and key negotiation between the caller and the callee in a VoIP 
environment.  Although several authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed in the past 
years, developing an energy-efficient and secure authentication protocol for SIP is still a challenging task. 
This is because the green VoIP networks require the authentication protocol to satisfy both the security 
and the efficiency requirements.  
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To avoid time-consuming operations, the hash function is considered to be the best candidate to use in 
the design of security measures. Since hash operations are faster than public key cryptography, hash-based 
authentication protocols meet low computational requirements of green VoIP by reducing the 
computational energy cost significantly. However, Kilinc and Yanik (2013) demonstrated that 
hashed-based authentication protocols had some inherent security weakness, so these protocols were very 
hard to provide strong security for SIP. Several authentication protocols adopt Public Key Cryptography 
(PKC) to achieve strong security. In order to simplify the authentication process and reduce time 
consuming operations, a verification table is required to store in the SIP server’s database for verification 
purposes in most PKC-based protocols. Although these protocols reduce the computational cost, but also 
arouse some issues inevitably. Compared with the protocols without using verification tables, these 
protocols are more vulnerable to guessing attacks, stolen-verifier attacks, and server-spoofing attacks due 
to the usage of the verification tables. Moreover, with the growth of the registered users the storage 
overhand will became very high. Furthermore, the maintenance of the large verification tables and the 
password updating process are all energy consuming operations. Obviously, the verification tables should 
be avoided when designing an energy-efficient authentication protocol for SIP. However, how to design 
an authentication protocol for SIP to meet both the secure and energy-efficient requirements remains a 
challenging work.  
In this study, our main objective was to design an energy-efficient authenticated key agreement 
protocol for SIP without using verification tables. Since no verification table needs to store in the SIP 
server database, the proposed protocol could not only enhance security but also avoid the energy 
consumption associated with verification table maintenance. In addition, the complexity analysis 
demonstrated that the proposed protocol reduced the computational cost in comparison with other related 
work.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related work is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, 
the proposed protocol is described in detail. Section 4 discuses the security of the proposed protocol. In 
Section 5, the performance of the proposed protocol is evaluated. And the paper is concluded in Section 6. 
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2. Related work 
Since the original authentication protocol of SIP is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks and 
server-spoofing attacks (Yang et al., 2005), it could not support integrity and confidentiality protection at 
an acceptable level for VoIP networks. Moreover, their experiment demonstrated that the computational 
cost on SIP proxy server was very high in the original authentication protocol (Yanik et al., 2008). 
Consequently, based on original authentication protocol, several improved protocols for SIP have been 
proposed to strength the security and promote the performance of VoIP communications.  
In order to overcome the security weakness of the original authentication protocol of SIP, Yang et al. 
(2005) proposed a SIP authentication protocol based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. In their 
protocol, a hashed password table was stored at the SIP server side, and the hashed password was used to 
realize mutual authentication and key agreement. However, Jo et al. (2009) argued that Yang et al.’s 
protocol was still suffered from the off-line password guessing attack and the usage of expensive 
exponential computation made their design impractical for SIP. To reduce the computational cost, 
Durlanik and Sogukpinar (2005) proposed a SIP authentication protocol by using elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC). Since ECC could achieve the same level security with a smaller key size, their 
protocol offered better performance in comparison with Yang et al.’s protocol. Unfortunately, Yoon and 
Yoo (2009) demonstrated that Durlanik et al.’s protocol was vulnerable to the Denning-Sacco attack. Wu 
and Wang (2009) also constructed an authentication protocol based on ECC. Since a common secret is 
shared between the IM services identity module (ISIM) and the authentication center (AC), their protocol 
achieved efficient mutual authentication. However, the protocol proposed by Wu et al. was suffered from 
off-line stolen-verifier attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks, and password guessing attacks (Yoon et al., 
2010b). Based on Wu et al.’s protocol, an improved authentication protocol was proposed by Yoon et al. 
(2010b) to eliminate security flaws. But Gokhroo et al. (2011) indicated that the improved protocol could 
not resist off-line password guessing attacks and replay attacks too. Recently, Arshad and Ikram (2013) 
also proposed an authentication protocol based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem for SIP. 
However, He et al. (2012) demonstrated that Arshad et al.’s protocol was suffered from off-line 
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password-guessing attacks and then proposed an improvement protocol to overcome the security 
weakness.  
In order to avoid time-consuming operations, Tsai (2009) adopted a one-way hash function to design an 
efficient authentication protocol for SIP. Since only one-way hash function and exclusive-or operations 
were used in their protocol, their protocol reduced computational cost significantly. However, Yoon et al. 
(2010a) demonstrated that Tsai’s protocol could not resist stolen-verifier attacks, off-line password 
guessing attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks, and failed to achieve perfect forward secrecy. To address these 
obstacles, Yoon et al. (2010a) proposed a new protocol. Unfortunately, the proposed protocol was 
vulnerable to stolen-verifier attacks and off-line password guessing attacks (Xie 2012).  
Almost all of the authentication protocols mentioned above require storing a password or verification 
table at the SIP server side. In these protocols, the SIP server verifies the user’s identity by using the 
passwords or hashed passwords stored in its database. The main merit of these authentication protocols is 
simple. As shown in Fig.1, since the user’s passwords are stored in the SIP server’s database, the 
adversary could launch a stolen-verifier attacks and password guessing attacks to obtain the user’s 
password. Moreover, a privileged-insider of the SIP server could easily steal the identity and 
password-verifier table from the SIP server and then use these passwords to impersonate a legal user to 
access other servers. Consequently, these protocols suffer from the insider attack. Furthermore, the 
required memories of the verification table increase with the number of the registered users. When there 
are a lot of registered users in the SIP server, the password or verification tables will became very large. 
Obviously, the maintenance of the verification table and the password updating process are all energy 
consuming operations which would limit these protocols’ scalability and applicability. Since the 
verification table stored at the SIP server not only leads to a risk of various attacks but also decreases the 
applicability for practical use, it should be avoided in the authentication protocol design for green VoIP 
networks. 
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Fig. 1. Malicious attacks by using a verification table in VoIP environment 
 
In order to eliminate the password or verification tables, Yeh et al. (2013) adopted the smartcard to 
construct an authentication protocol based on ECC for SIP. However their protocol involved the time 
synchronization problem. Furthermore, the computational cost of the protocol was very high due to 12 
times of ECC computation operations were involved. Zhang et al. (2013) also proposed an authenticated 
key agreement protocol based on ECC to avoid the storage of a verification table at the SIP server side. But 
Irshad et al. (2014) argued that the protocol was suffered from impersonation attacks and then proposed a 
single round-trip authentication scheme to overcome security flaws. Unfortunately, their protocol was 
vulnerable to user impersonation attacks (Arshad and Nikooghadam, 2014). Although Arshad et al.’s 
improved protocol strength the security, a verification table was required to store in the SIP server’s 
database. Tu et al. (2014) also proposed a new authentication protocol to overcome the weakness of Zhang 
et al.’s protocol. But, their protocol could not withstand impersonation attacks and password changing 
attacks (Farash, 2014; Farash and Attari, 2014).  
Although several attempts have been made to avoid the usage of the verification table, but designing a 
secure and energy-efficient authenticated key agreement protocol without using the verification table for 
SIP is still a challenging task. In this study, an efficient authentication protocol for SIP is proposed by 
using smartcard based on ECC. Since no verification table needs to store in the SIP server’s database, the 
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proposed protocol not only enhances the security but also avoids energy consumption for the maintenance 
of verification tables. In addition, performance analysis demonstrates that the proposed protocol reduces 
the computational costs in comparison with other related protocols. 
 
3. Energy-efficient authentication key agreement protocol  
In this section, we present our energy-efficient authenticated key agreement protocol of SIP in detail. 
The proposed protocol comprises four phases: initialization phase, registration phase, authentication 
phase, and password changing phase. The notations adopted throughout the rest paper are summarized in 
Table 1. Next, our protocol is described in detail as follows, and it is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
Table 1 Notations and Terminology 
Ui User i 
S SIP server 
IDi Identity of the user Ui 
PWi A low-entropy password of Ui 
s A high-entropy secret key of S 
p A prime power 
P A generator point with the order n over Ep(a,b)  
Fp A prime finite field 
Ep(a,b) An elliptic curve equation 
r,r1,r2,r3,r4 High-entropy random numbers 
SK A shared common session key  
Ek(.) A secure symmetric encryption algorithm with the 
secret key k 
h(.) Secure one-way hash function 
(Q)x/(Q)y x-coordinate value or y-coordinate value of elliptic 
curve point Q 
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  A bit-wise exclusive-or (XOR) operation 
 Message concatenation operation 
:X Y M  X sends a message M to Y 
 
3.1 Initialization phase 
In this phase, the SIP server S sets up several security parameters used for authentication and key 
agreement. 
Step S1: The SIP server S selects an elliptic curve equation 2 3( , ) : (mod )pE a b y x ax b p   over a 
prime finite field Fp, where , pa b F and 3 24 27 0(mod )a b p  . Next it chooses a base point P 
over Ep(a, b)  . 
Step S2: The server S chooses a high entropy random integer s as its secret key and computes pubP sP . 
And then the server S constructs a secure one-way hash function *( ) :{0,1} {0,1}kh   .  
Step S3: The server S keeps s secret and publishes { ( , ), , , ( )}p pubE a b P P h  as its public parameters. 
3.2 Registration phase 
When a new user Ui wants to register with the SIP server S, it performs the following process with the 
SIP server S to complete the registration process.  
Step R1: 1: ( , )i iU S ID C  
The user Ui first selects its identity IDi, and its password PWi freely, and chooses a random high entropy 
random integer r. Next, it selects a one-way hash function *( ) :{0,1} {0,1}kh   and computes 
1 ( )iC h PW r   . Then, the user U sends {IDi, C1} to the SIP server S over a secure channel. 
Step R2: 3: ( )iS U Smartcard C  
After receiving the information, the SIP server S computes 2 ( )iC h ID s  , and 3 1 2C C C    
( ) ( )i ih PW r h ID s    by using its secret key s and the received message from the user Ui.  After that, 
the SIP server S records the secure information C3 in the memory of the smart card and delivers this smart 
card to Ui through a secure channel.  
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Step R3: Upon receiving the smart card, Ui  writes  r into the smart card secretly. And then the memory 
of the smart card contains (C3, r). 
3.3 Authentication phase 
During the authentication process, the user Ui and the SIP server S perform the following steps to 
achieve mutual authentication and key negotiation. 
Step A1: 4 6: ( , , )i iU S REQUEST ID C C  
First, the user Ui inserts its smartcard into the smartcard reader, and enters its identity IDi and its 
password PWi. Then the smartcard computes 2 3 ( ) ( )i iC C h PW r h ID s     by using the input 
password PWi and the secret information (C3, r) stored in the smartcard. After that, the smartcard chooses 
a high entropy random integer r1 and calculates 4 1C r P  and 5 1 2 pubC rC P . And then it selects a random 
integer r2 and computes 6 5 2 5 5( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) )i x yC h C h ID s r C C    , where 5( )xC and 5( ) yC  are 
x-coordinate value and y-coordinate value of elliptic curve point C5, respectively. Finally, the user Ui 
relays a request message REQUEST (IDi, C4, C6) to the SIP server S over a public channel. 
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Fig. 2. Authenticated key agreement phase 
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Upon receiving the message REQUEST (IDi, C4, C6), the SIP server S adopts its secret key s and the 
received message IDi to compute 2 ( )iC h ID s  . After that it retrieves 
2 5 5( ( ) ( ) ( ) )i x yh ID s r C C  from the received message C6 by computing 2 5 5( ( ) ( ) ( ) )i x yh ID s r C C   
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checks whether the following equation holds 
?
5 5 2 4 2 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x y x yC C sC C sC C . If it is not equivalent, the 
authentication process stops; otherwise, the SIP server S calculates 2 2( )iC h ID s r    to obtain the 
random integer r2. Next it chooses two random integers (r3, r4) and then computes 7 3C r P  and the 
session key 4 3 4 7( )SK h C r C C . Next, the SIP server S generates an authentication 
message 2 5 5( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )s i x x y yAuth h h ID s r SK C SK C  . Finally it submits a challenge message 
CHALLENGE (realm, C7, Auths, r4) to the Ui.  
Step A3: : ( , )i uU S RESPONSE realm Auth  
After receiving the message CHALLENGE (realm, C7, Auths, r4), the smartcard adopts r1 and the 
received message C7 to compute the session key 4 1 7 7( )SK h C r C C . And then it calculates 
2 2 5 5( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )x y yxh C r SK C SK C   and verifies whether it is equal to the received authentication 
message Auths. If true, the user Ui sets SK as the shared session key and generates the authentication 
information 4(( ) ( 1) ( ) )u x yAuth h SK r SK  ; otherwise, it terminates the authentication session. Finally, 
the user Ui sends a response message RESPONSE (realm, Authu) to the SIP server S.  
Step A4: After receiving the message RESPONSE (realm, Authu), the SIP server S checks whether the 
following equation holds
?
4(( ) ( 1) ( ) )u x yAuth h SK r SK  . If not, it stops the authentication process; 
otherwise, it sets 1 3SK r r P as the shared session key with the user Ui.  
3.4 Password changing phase  
During the password changing phase, the user Ui can change its password PW freely and securely. The 
steps of the password changing phase are executed as follows and are shown in Fig. 3.  
Step P1: iU  S (V) 
If the user Ui wants to change its password, it chooses a new password *iPW , a new random integer 
*r and a nonce R for freshness verification. Next, it inputs its old password and calculates 
3( )iZ h PW r C   and * *( ) ( ( ) )xSK i iV E h PW r ID R Z  , where ( ) (.)xSKE  is an encryption function 
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with the x-coordinate of elliptic curve point SK as an encryption key encrypts. Finally, the user Ui submits 
V to the SIP server S.  
Step P2: S :iU (W) 
Upon receiving the message, the SIP server S decrypts the received message V by using its session key 
SK and calculates ( )ih ID s by using its secret key s and the decrypted value IDi. And then it verifies 
whether the following equation holds
?
( )ih ID s Z  . If not, it refuses the password updating requirement; 
otherwise, it computes a new secret value * * *3 ( ) ( )i iC h PW r h ID s    and an encryption value 
* *
( ) 3 3( ( ( 1)))xSKW E C h C R  . And then it submits W to the user Ui.  
Step P3: After receiving the message W, the user Ui decrypts the message and checks whether the 
authentication tag *3( ( 1))h C R  is valid. If true, it replaces the old values (C3, r) with ( * *3 ,C r ); otherwise, 
it stops the password updating process. 
 
Fig. 3. Password updating phase 
 
4. Security analysis 
 In this section, we evaluate the security of our proposed protocol by analyzing some possible attacks. 
1) Replay attacks 
Password Changing Phase:  
Select * *, ,iPW r R  
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Compute 3( )iZ h PW r C   , V 
Decrypt W 
Verify authentication tag *3( ( 1))h C R   
Decrypt V 
Verify 
?
( )ih ID s Z   
Compute *3 ,C W  
 (V) 
(W
Compute ( )ih ID s  
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Suppose an adversary Bob obtains previous request message REQUEST (IDi, C4, C6) in Step A1 and 
replays it to the SIP server S. In the proposed protocol, the SIP server S will detect this replay attack easily 
in Step A3 by checking the authentication information Authu. This is because Bob cannot correctly guess 
the session key SK from the intercepted information to construct a valid Authu. To generate a valid session 
key SK, Bob needs to extract r1 from C4 or retrieve r3 from C7, which is equivalent to solving an instance 
of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. For the same reason, Bob cannot obtain r1 from the 
intercepted message C6. In addition, since SK is protected by a secure one-way hash function, Bob cannot 
get it from Auths. 
Next, we assume that the previous message CHALLENGE (realm, C7, Auths, r4) is intercepted by an 
adversary Bob and then Bob transforms this message to the user Ui. This attack will be found when the 
user Ui verifies the equation
?
2 2 5 5( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )s x x y yAuth h C r SK C SK C in Step A3. For the same reason, 
Bob cannot pass this verification process without the knowledge of SK and the SIP server’s secret key s.  
Therefore, Bob cannot launch the replay attack successfully in the proposed protocol.  
2) Man-in-the-middle attacks 
In the proposed protocol, mutual authentication is provided to resist Man-in-the-middle attacks. If an 
adversary Bob attempts to impersonate Ui to establish an independent connection and share a session key 
with S, he needs to pass the verification process of the SIP server S. To pass this verification process, Bob 
needs to generate a valid session key SK. When Bob tries to extract r1 or r2 to construct SK, he faces the 
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. So Bob cannot pass the verification of the SIP server S. For the 
same reason, Bob cannot go through the verification process of Ui without the knowledge of SK and the 
SIP server’s secret key s. So he cannot impersonate S to share a session key and make an independent 
connection with the user Ui.  
The above analysis illustrates that the proposed protocol can resist the man-in-middle attack. 
3) Modification attacks 
Assume that an adversary Bob modifies the REQUEST message and submits the fraud message 
' '
4 6( , , )iID C C  to the SIP server S. However, this modification can be found easily when SIP server S 
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checks the equation
?
5 5 2 4 2 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x y x yC C sC C sC C . This is because Bob cannot generate a valid C5 
without the knowledge of key s. Therefore, Bob cannot launch the modification attack successfully by 
fabricating the REQUEST message.  
If Bob modifies a CHALLENGE message and sends this forgery ' '7( , , )srealm C Athu  to the user Ui. 
However, the user Ui will detect this attack, since Bob cannot construct a valid 'sAthu and pass the 
equation verification of 
?
2 2 5 5( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )s x x y yAuth h C r SK C SK C  without the knowledge of SK and 
the SIP server’s key s. So, Bob cannot impersonate the SIP server by modifying the CHALLENGE 
message. 
Suppose Bob modifies the message RESPONSE '( , )urealm Athu  and submits it to the SIP server S. 
Since Bob cannot guess the session key SK correctly, this impersonating attack will be found by checking 
the 'uAuth value with the computed value 4(( ) ( 1) ( ) )x yh SK r SK in Step A4.  
Therefore, the modification attack is invalid in the proposed protocol. 
4) Denning-Sacco attacks 
Suppose an adversary Bob compromises the previous session key 1 1 3 3( )SK h r P r r P r P  and tries to 
obtain the user Ui’s password PWi and the SIP S’s secret key s. Since the session key SK is constructed by 
three elliptic curve points and is not connected with the user Ui’s password PWi or the SIP server’s private 
key s. Bob cannot obtains the secret long-term privacy key PWi or s by compromising an old session key 
SK. In addition, in each session a fresh session key is generated by using r1P, r1r3P, and r3P, where the 
integer r1 is chosen by the user Ui and the integer r3 is selected by the SIP server S randomly. Since the 
session key SK is not connected with each other, the adversary Bob cannot figure out other session keys 
with an old session key. 
 Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist Denning-Sacco attacks.  
5) Stolen-verifier attacks 
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There is no password or verification table needed to be stored in the SIP server side. Consequently, the 
adversary Bob cannot steal the user’s personal information by launching an attack to obtain the 
verification table stored in the SIP server database. So, in the authentication process, the adversary cannot 
impersonate the user Ui to cheat the SIP server S by using the stolen information stored in the SIP server 
database.  
Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the stolen-verifier attack successfully. 
6) Offline dictionary attacks without the smart card 
If an adversary Bob intends to perform an offline dictionary attack, and he obtains all the messages 
during the authentication process. Since the messages transmitted between the user Ui and the SIP server 
S do not include any information about the user Ui’s password PWi, the adversary Bob cannot determine 
whether each of his guessed passwords is correct or not by using the intercepted information.  
Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the offline dictionary attack without the smart card. 
7) Offline dictionary attacks with the smart card 
Suppose, an adversary Bob compromises the user’s secret information (C3, r) stored in the smart card 
and records all the messages transmitted during the authentication process. In this cast, Bob possess 
additional information (C3, r) stored in the smartcard. However, Bob cannot obtain ( )ih PW r  without 
the knowledge of the SIP server S’s secret key s. So, the extra information (C3, r) cannot help Bob to 
guess the user U’s password correctly.  
Therefore, the offline dictionary attack with the smart card cannot be launched successfully in the 
proposed protocol.  
8) Insider attacks 
Since no password or verification tables are needed to be stored at the SIP server side in the proposed 
protocol, a privileged-insider of the SIP server cannot access other servers successfully by stealing the 
identity and password-verifier table from the SIP server S.  
Therefore, the proposed authentication process can resist insider attacks successfully.  
9) Password disclosure attacks 
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In our protocol, the user Ui submits 1 ( )iC h PW r   instead of its original password PWi to the SIP 
server S. Since the real password PWi is protected by a high entropy random integer r, the SIP server S 
cannot obtain the user U’s real password in the registration phase.  
Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the password disclosure attack. 
10) Session key security 
In the proposed protocol, only the user Ui and the SIP server S know the session key at the end of the 
key negotiation process 1 1 3 3( )SK h r P r r P r P .  This is because Bob cannot correctly guess r1r3P from 
the intercepted information to construct a valid SK. To generate a valid session key SK, Bob needs to 
extract r1 from C4 or retrieve r3 from C7, which is equivalent to solving an instance of elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm problem. So, the session key SK is not known by anyone but only the user Ui and the 
SIP server S.  
Therefore, session key security is provided in the proposed protocol.  
11) Known-key security 
In the proposed protocol, the user Ui and the SIP server S choose two random integers r1 and r2 
respectively in each session process. Since the two integers are different in every session key negotiation 
process, the SK of each session is not connected with other session keys. Since a different session key is 
generated in each session, an adversary Bob cannot figure out another session key 
' ' ' ' '
1 1 3 3( )SK h r P r r P r P  by using a compromised session key 1 1 3 3( )SK h r P r r P r P . So, a unique session 
key SK is generated between the user Ui and the SIP server S in each run of the authentication process.  
Therefore, the proposed protocol provides known-key security successfully. 
12) Perfect forward secrecy 
Assume that an adversary Bob compromises the user Ui’s password PWi and the SIP server S’s secret 
key s. And then it attempts to find the previous session key 1 1 3 3( )SK h r P r r P r P . However, without the 
knowledge of r1 or r2, he cannot construct the previous session key SK. This is because the two integers 
are protected by elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. In addition, Bob cannot extract SK directly 
from Auths or Authu since it is protected by a one-way hash function. So, even if the user Ui’s password 
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PWi and the SIP server S’s secret key s are compromised by the adversary Bob, the previous session keys 
would not be compromised. Therefore, the proposed protocol can provide perfect forward secrecy. 
13) Mutual authentication 
In the proposed protocol, the user Ui and the SIP server S can verify the identity of each other via Auths 
and Authu. Therefore, the proposed protocol can provide mutual authentication. 
14) Security chosen and update password 
In the proposed protocol, the user can freely choose her or his password in the registration phase. In 
addition, a password updating function is provided for users to change their passwords easily and freely. 
Furthermore, even if the smart card was stolen or lost, other person could not change the password 
without knowing the user’s password. 
 
5 Performance comparisons 
In our study, we compared the proposed protocol with other related protocols in terms of functionality 
and computational cost. Since no password or verification table is stored in the SIP server’s database, the 
proposed protocol avoids energy consumption for maintenance of the verification table. Furthermore, 
several attacks associated with the verification table could be resisted successfully with the proposed 
protocol. As shown in Table 2, the protocols proposed by Tsai (2009), Arshad and Ikram (2013), and He 
et al. (2012) all required the SIP server storing a verification table and did not provide efficient password 
updating. In addition, Arshad’s protocol was suffered from offline password guessing attacks. And Tsai’s 
protocol could not resist offline password guessing attacks, Denning Sacco attacks, and stolen verifier 
attack, so it was weaker than other related protocols. The protocol proposed by Tu et al. (2014) did not 
need to store a verification table in the SIP server database, but it was vulnerable to modification attacks 
and could not provide password updating. Although Yeh et al.’s protocol satisfied most of the security 
requirements, it involved the time synchronization problem. As shown in Table 2, the proposed protocol 
could not only secure against several attacks but also provide some unique features such as no password 
or verification table needed, no time synchronization issue, and efficient password updating, etc.  
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Table 2. The functionality comparisons between the proposed protocol and others 
Security Attacks and Features Tsai 
(2009) 
Arshad and Ikram 
(2013) 
He et al. 
(2012) 
Yeh et al. 
(2013) 
Tu et al. 
(2014) 
Our 
protocol 
Replay attack resist Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Modification attack resist Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Offline password guessing attack resist No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stolen verifier attack resist No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Denning Sacco attack resist No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mutual Authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Password updating No No No Yes No Yes 
No verifier table  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
No time synchronization Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
We also compared the computational cost of the proposed protocol with other related protocols.  To 
simulate a practical environment, the SIP server and the client were installed on two PCs over the local 
area network in our experiments.  The hardware platform for client was Intel Pentium G630 processor 
with 4 GB memory which offered maximum clock speeds of 2.7 GHz. The Intel G850 processor was 
adopted at the SIP server side, which offered maximum clock speeds of 2.90 GHz and 4 GB memory. 
Furthermore, a NIST/SECG-standard elliptic curve over a 521 bits prime field and SHA-1as a one-way 
hash function were adopted in our experiments. Then some notations are defined as follows: 
(1) Tm: the time for executing a scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve; 
(2) Ta: the time for executing a point addition operation of elliptic curve; 
(3) Th: the time for executing a one-way hash function (string to number); 
(4) TH: the time for executing a one-way hash function (string to point); 
(5) Tv: the time for executing a modular inversion operation. 
As shown in Table 3, in the registration phase, two hash operations are needed to compute C1 on the 
user side and C2 on the SIP server side. Since only two hash operations are adopted in the registration 
phase, the execution time of this process is estimated to be 0.012ms.  
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In the authentication phase, the user side needs three scalar multiplication operations of elliptic curve 
to obtain C4, C5 and r1C7; four hash operations to generate 5( )h C , SK, Auths and Authu. The SIP server side 
requires three scalar multiplication operations of elliptic curve to compute sC2C4, C7 and r3C4; and five 
hash operations to obtain C2, h(sC2C4), SK, Auths and Authu. The experimental results showed that 
69.12ms was required during the authentication process in the proposed protocol.  
According to Yeh et al.’s protocol, the user side requires one hash operation to compute ( )x rh pw N  
during the registration process, and the SIP server side needs two hash operations to obtain 
( )yh id pw and ( )yh id pw : a scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve  and a hash operation to 
compute 1( )sq H id . In Tu et al.’s protocol, the user side needs one hash operation to obtain ( )h pw a  
during the registration process, and the SIP server side requires one scalar multiplication operation of 
elliptic curve and one hash operation to compute ( ( ) ( )h pw a h username s P . 
Table 3. Computational comparisons between our protocol and others  
Performance Properties Tsai  
(2009) 
Arshad and 
Ikram (2013) 
He et al. 
(2012) 
Yeh et al. 
(2013) 
Tu et al. 
(2014) 
Our  
protocol 
Registration  User side    Th Th Th 
Server 
side 
 2Th 2Th 2Th+ TH+Tm Tm +Th Th 
Execute 
time 
 0.012ms 0.012ms 10.212ms 9.860ms 0.012ms 
Authentication User side 4TH 2Tm +3Th 3Tm +3Th 4Tm+2Ta+6Th 3Tm +Ta+4Th 3Tm+4Th 
Server 
side 
3TH 3Tm+Tv+3Th 3Tm +3Th 3Tm+2Ta+5Th 3Tm +4Th  3Tm+5Th 
Execute 
time 
0.724 ms 57.612 ms 69.084 ms 98.620 ms 71.096 ms 69.12 ms 
  
As shown in Fig. 4, compared with other protocols, Tsai’s protocol achieves the best performance, 
since only one-way hash function and exclusive-or operations are used during the authentication process. 
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Although Tsai’s protocol reduces the computational cost significantly, their protocol has some security 
weaknesses. So their protocol is not suitable for VoIP networks. The experimental results show that our 
protocol is as efficient as Arshad and Ikram’s protocol and He et al.’s protocol, which needs to store a 
verification table in the SIP server’s database. Since our protocol avoids the energy consumption from the 
maintenance of the verification table, it is more suitable for green VoIP networks in comparison with 
Arshad and Ikram’s protocol and He et al.’s protocol. Moreover, compared with Yeh et al.’s protocol and 
Tu et al.’s protocol, our proposed protocol possesses better performance by reducing the scalar 
multiplication operations of elliptic curve and by eliminating the point addition operations of elliptic 
curve. 
 
Fig. 4 Execution time comparisons between our protocol and others 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this study, we proposed an energy-efficient authentication protocol for SIP without using a 
verification table. Based on ECC, the proposed protocol realized mutual authentication and key 
negotiation by using password and smartcard. Sine no password or verification table was required to store 
at the SIP server side, the proposed protocol avoided the energy consumption for the maintenance of a 
large verification table. Furthermore, the proposed protocol could resist several attacks associated with 
verification tables, such as insider attacks, stolen verifier attacks, and password guessing attacks. Security 
analysis demonstrated that our protocol was more secure than the related protocols. And the experimental 
results showed that the proposed protocol reduced the computational cost in comparison with the 
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protocols without using verification tables. Therefore, the proposed authentication protocol is more 
suitable for green VoIP networks.  
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